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"I KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT"': THE NLRB'S
GLARING INCONSISTENCIES WHEN
CLASSIFYING WORKERS
HunterIgoe

INTRODUCTION
You are behind the wheel, the eighth passenger of the evening in the
backseat of your Toyota Camry,2 as you approach your passenger's
destination. As you arrive, your phone lights up and sings: another request
for a ride. The screen only displays the address where you pick the
passenger up and the option to accept or decline. 3 You think quickly
before the offer ends, thinking whether or not you have driven enough
today. Ultimately, you accept the request, deciding to accept one more
pick-up.
You drop your current passenger off and check the next passenger's
destination: it is worse than you could have thought. The destination is
an hour and a half away. You consider cancelling the pick-up, but
remember the "ridesharing" 4 app you use can suspend your account if you
cancel too many trips. 5 The fare will probably be high because of how far
the drop off is, but the app does not tell you the amount. 6 You are not
sure if it will be worth the trip.

1. This is in reference to Justice Potter Stewart's decision in Jacobellis v. Ohio, a Supreme
Court case regarding obscenity. In the case, Justice Stewart famously remarked, "I shall not today
attempt to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within the shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v.

Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
2. According to Consumer Reports, the Toyota Camry is the best sedan for Uber and Lyft
drivers. Keith Barry, Best Carsfor Uber and Lyft Drivers, CONSUMER REPS. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://
www.consumerreports.org/ride-hailing/best-cars-for-uber-and-lyft-drivers/.
3. See Alex Rosenblat, The Truth About How Uber'sApp Manages Drivers,HARV. BUS. REV.

(Apr. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/the-truth-about-how-ubers-app-manages-drivers.
4. Both Uber and Lyft are frequently referred to as ridesharing services. What is ridesharing?,
GCF GLOBAL, https://edu.gcfglobal.org/en/sharingeconomy/what-is-ridesharing/l/ (last visited Mar.

25, 2021).
5. Rosenblat, supra note 3.

6. Id.
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Nevertheless, you feel compelled to follow through. Any plan of
ending the night early has vanished. You pick up your new passenger,
drive the hour and a half to his destination, drive the hour and a half back
home, and finally end your workday. You check your ride sharing app
account, and despite all the driving you did, the amount you earned for
the hours you worked does not even equal the state minimum wage.7
Some days pass and a friend, who also drives with the same
ridesharing app, approaches you. She tells you that she and a group of
other drivers are trying to form a union to demand better fares, paid sick
time, and possibly more. You are immediately interested. You, your
friend, and the prospective union continue organizing when you all hit a
road bump: a labor attorney tells you the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter "NLRB" or "the Board"), the federal agency that recognizes
unions, is unlikely to recognize the prospective union. 8 The attorney
explains that the Board will only recognize a union of employees, and
according to the agreement with the ridesharing app, you are all
independent contractors. 9
Classifying a worker is inherently challenging and entirely fact
specific. 10 It is a determination that can hinge on the smallest fact or
slightest alteration to them.11 What if your ridesharing company let you
decide how much you charged for a ride? Or if you kept the entirety of
the fare, but paid a weekly fee to the ridesharing company? What if you
were required to wear a uniform or drive a car provided by the ridesharing
company? Or what if you could decline a ride at any time without any
discipline from your ridesharing company? Any one of these changes
could alter the outcome of a worker classification. 12 Therefore, while the
labor attorney that spoke to the prospective union was surely well

7.

Sam Levin, Uber drivers often make below minimum wage, reportfinds, THE GUARDIAN

(Mar. 5, 2018, 7:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/O1/uber-lyft-driverwages-median-report.
8. What We Do, NAT'L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/what-we-do (last
visited Mar. 25, 2021).
9.

See generally Greg Bensinger, Uber: The ride-hailing app that says it has 'zero' drivers,

WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/14
/uber-ride-hailing-app-that-says-it-has-zero-drivers/ (quoting Uber executive Nicholas Valentino
who stated that "They're independent, third-party transportation providers.").
10. Charles J. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law,

MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 5 (Jan. 2002), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/artl full.pdf. (There is
a totality of the circumstances approach that governs the characterization of an employee).
11. See id. (explaining that several factors are weighed when determining a worker
classification).
12. See infra Part II.
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intentioned, it is nearly impossible to predict whether or not the Board
13
will classify a worker as an employee or an independent contractor.
This Note focuses on the Board's approach to classifying workers,
arguing the Board's fact driven, case-by-case, unpredictable approach is
fundamentally flawed.1 4 The approach is nothing more than an 'I-knowit-when-I-see-it' determination with no room for a meaningful review of
the decision. 15 No attorney-nor worker-can rely on such inconsistent
decisions that change so rapidly. 16 Part L.A of this Note attempts to define
17
employee and independent contractor, highlighting the difficulties,
while Part I.B explains why the distinction between employee and
independent contractor matters. 18 Part I.B.1 lists some of the rights
19
employees are afforded but independent contractors are not, and Part
I.B.2 demonstrates how the growing gig economy is causing workers
facing economic challenges to be classified as independent contractors,
20
and therefore not receiving the protections employee status brings.
Part II illustrates how the Board classifies workers, both currently
and historically.21 Part II.A highlights where the Board receives its
authority to "define" employee and independent contractor, namely
through two Supreme Court decisions: NLRB v. United Insurance Co. and
22
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Part II.B
23
It focuses on driversdissects the Board's classification of workers.
drivers-from the
"ridesharing"
delivery drivers, taxicab drivers, and
24
This section shows the Board's
Clinton era through the Trump era.
ever-changing approach to classification, its inconsistency in the
application of established tests, and its failure to follow its own
precedent. 25

13.
14.
15.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part H.B.

16.

See infra Part I.B.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part I.A.
infra Part I.B.
infra Part I.B.1.
infra Part I.B.2.
infra Part I.
infra Part H.A.

23. See infra Part I.B; see also NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (stating
that the Board is tasked with distinguishing between employees and independent contractors).
24. Id.; see generally Velox Express, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 2-3 (2019) (displaying an
example of a Trump era Board decision); see also Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 72,
850 (1998) (displaying an example of a Clinton era Board decision).
25. See generally SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 7-8 (2019) (showing an
example of the Board overruling its previous precedent).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

3

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

288

[Vol. 38:2

BACKGROUND

I.

A. DefiningIndependent Contractor& Employee
Defming
"independent
contractor"
and
"employee"
is
extraordinarily difficult for a multitude of reasons. 26 First, an independent
contractor is primarily defined by what it is not-an employee. 2 7 A
similar problem emerges with employee being commonly defined as an
individual who is "employed." 2 8 Black's Law Dictionary attempts to
more adequately define the terms, but still comes up short. 2 9 There, an
independent contractor is defined as a "person who is asked to perform an
action or job who maintains the control over the job." 30 Employee is not
given a strict definition, but instead Black's states the term is "ordinarily
... used to signify a person in some official employment, and ... [i]s
understood to mean some permanent employment or position." 3 1 Second,
as laid out below, various government agencies define independent
contractors differently, and typically reach their definition through
assessing a variety of varying factors. 32
The National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA"), the act that
governs and protects unionization, is also not helpful when determining
who is and who is not an employee as the NLRA defines "employee" to
"include any employee." 33 While the NLRA listed individuals who are
not employees-"agricultural laborer[s]" and "domestic" workers-it
was not until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendment in 1947 that

26.

See Muhl, supranote 10, at 3, 5.

27. See INDEPENDENTCONTRACTOR, THE L. DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.thelaw.com
/independent-contractor/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (defining independent contractor as a "person
who is hired to do a job that is not an employee."); Independent Contractor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/independent%20contractor (last visited Apr. 14, 2020)

(defining independent contractor as "a person hired to do work who controls how the work is done.").
28. Employee, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/employee
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020); Employee, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse

/employee (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (defining employee as "a person working for another person or
a business firm for pay."); Employee, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us
/dictionary/english/employee (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (defining employee as "someone who is paid
to work for someone else.").

29.

See

What is INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR?,

THE L.

DICTIONARY,

https://

thelawdictionary.org/independent-contractor/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).

30. Id.
31. What is EMPLOYEE?, THE L. DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/employee/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020).
32. See Muhl, supra note 10, at 5 (stating that different tests are applied in different jurisdictions
which can lead to varying classifications).
33. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
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"supervisors," individuals working for their parents or spouse, and
"independent contractors" were added to the exclusions. 34 Yet still, other
than defining "supervisor," the Act and subsequent Amendment did not
shine light on the meaning of these exclusions. 35 This has left the Board
to "define" these terms through the agency's statutory interpretation
authority. 36 The Board has done this by classifying workers through
agency adjudications. 3 7 The common-law agency test-the Board's
current classification test-has changed drastically over the years. 38 This
change is outlined in Part II.B. 39
The Board is not the only agency tasked with parsing out whether a
worker is an employee or independent contractor. 40 Other federal
agencies-including the Department of Labor (hereinafter "DOL"), the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"), and
the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "IRS")-are tasked with
classifying workers regarding the statutes they administer.4 1 These
agencies all face the same problem as the Board, in that they must classify
workers as employees and independent contractors, and the statutes they
administer fail to adequately define these terms. 42 Each agency uses a
different test, resulting in more confusion for workers and the legal

34. Id.; Max Rivlin-Nadler, Freelancingand Labor Law: A Short History, THE FREELANCE
CREATIVE (Jan. 26, 2016), https://contently.net/2016/01/26/resources/tools/legal/freelancing-laborlaw-short-history/attachment/union_shutterstock_237229153/.

35. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11); see also Rivlin-Nadler, supra note 34.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See generally Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 842, 843, 849 (1998)
(discussing several proceedings where the Board had to resolve employee-definition issues).
38. See discussion infra Part I.B.
39. See discussion infra Part I.B.
See infra note 41.
The Wage and Hour Division of the DOL enforces the Fair Labor Standards Act. Major
Laws Administered/Enforced, U.S. DEP'T LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, https://www.dol.gov
/agencies/whd/laws-and-regulations/laws (last accessed Apr. 30, 2020). The DOL enforces the
40.
41.

Family and Medical Leave Act for most employees. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), U.S.
DEP'T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/workhours/fmla (last accessed Apr. 30, 2020). The
EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, The Equal Pay
Act, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title II of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act. What Laws Does EEOC Enforce?, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/laws.html (last accessed Apr. 30, 2020). The IRS enforces
the Internal Revenue Code. Criminal Investigation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov
/compliance/criminal-investigation (last accessed Apr. 30, 2020).
42. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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community. 4 3 The DOL applies the economic realities test,44 the EEOC
applies the sixteen-factor independent contractor checklist,4 5 and the IRS
focuses on three broad categories: behavioral control, financial control,
and the relationship between the parties.4 6 Therefore, it is possible to be
classified as an employee by one agency and an independent contractor
by another. 47
Several scholars have pointed out the challenges agencies and courts
face in defining employee and independent contractor, and have attempted
to more adequately define these terms. 48 For instance, John Pearce II and
Jonathan Silva propose a universal adoption of the "ABC Test" 49 for all
statutes that call for classifying workers as employees or independent
contractors. 50 Alternatively, Pearce and Silva, as well as several other
scholars, advocate for a third classification, most commonly referred to as
a "dependent contractor." 5 1 These scholars, however, root the need for
change in the confusion caused by the number of varying tests applied by

43. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
44. Fact Sheet #13: Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
U.S. DEP'T LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIv. (July 2008), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/13-

flsa-employment-relationship.
45. Section 2 Threshold Issues, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (May 12, 2000), https://
www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-2-threshold-issues; EEOC Independent ContractorChecklist,
https://gtm.com/household/wp-content/uploads/EEOC Independent
SERV.,
GTM
PAYROLL

_Contractor_Checklist.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2021).
46. Understanding Employee vs. Independent Contractor, IRS (July 20, 2017), https://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-employee-vs-contractor-designation.
47. See John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent Contractors and
Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L. J.

1, 3 (2018).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 27 ("The ABC Test is a simplified version of the common law 'right to control'
test ... This succinct test requires employers to show: (A) that 'the individual is free from control and
direction in connection with the performance of service and in fact,' (B) that 'the service is performed
outside the usual course of the business of the employer,' and (C) that 'the individual is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of the same nature
as that involved in the service performed."').

50.

Id.at 26-30.

51. Id. at 30-31, 34; see also Carl Shaffer, Square Pegs Do Not Fit in Round Holes: The Case
for a Third Worker Classicationfor the Sharing Economy and TransportationNetwork Company

Drivers, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 1031, 1057-59 (2017); Carol Louise Williamson, PoachedEggs: The
Misclassification of Egg Donors as Independent Contractorsand How Egg Donors Can Contribute
to the Argument for a New Category of Worker-The Dependent Contractor, 51 GA. L. REV. 327,
352-53 (2016); but see Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for

the Gig Economy, 19 N.C. J. L. & TECH 443, 480-81 (2018) (instead referring to a third classification
as "independent employees").
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different agencies,52 circuit court splits, 53 and the changing economic
circumstances workers face in the modern economy. 54 The scope of this
Note is focused exclusively on the NLRB's approach to classifying
workers, highlighting the inconsistencies within the agency's
understanding and application of its preferred legal test.55
B.

Why the DistinctionMatters
1.

Employees Possess More Rights than Independent
Contractors

The distinction between employees and independent contractors
determines the rights workers are afforded. 56
Under the NLRA,
employees are guaranteed "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 57
These rights are commonly referred to as Section 7 rights, as they are
enshrined in Section 7 of the NLRA.5 8 Simply put, the NLRA recognizes
workers' rights to unionize. 59 Unions have far greater bargaining power
than workers would individually. 60 This greater bargaining power allows
unions-on behalf of their members-to negotiate with employees over
workplace safety, higher wages, and benefits, such as health coverage,
pensions, and leave.61

52.

See John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent ContractorDichotomy: A Rose is Not Always

a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 337, 342-43, 348-49, 357 (1991).
53. Pearce & Silva, supranote 47, at 15, 16-18.
54. See Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & The FutureofEmployment and Labor Law, 51 U.S.F.
L. REv. 51, 56 (2017).
55. See discussion infra Part II.
56. See generally Rivlin-Nadler, supra note 34 (discussing how the Board had held that
independent contractors are not, by definition, employees and therefore are not entitled to the
protection and benefits of employees).

57. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
58. Id.; Mammoth Team, What are Section 7 Rights?, MAMMOTH (Aug. 18, 2016), https://
blog.mammothhr.com/what-are-section-7-rights.

59.
BD.,

29 U.S.C. § 157; Interferingwith employee rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NAT'L LAB. RELS.
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-

section-7-8ai (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).
60. What are the Benefits of Being a Union Worker?, UWUA: AFL-CIO, https://uwua.net
/what-are-the-benefits-of-being-a-union-worker/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).

61.

Id.
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62
Unions are frequently met with great success in their negotiations.
For example, on average, union members 63 make thirty percent more than
their non-union counterparts. 64 Union members are twenty-four percent
more likely to have health coverage through their employer, with ninetytwo percent of all union members receiving such a benefit. 65 Union health
coverage is often better for workers as well, with union members paying
eighteen percent less in deductibles. 66 Additionally, union members are
between fifty-four percent and sixty-five percent more likely to have
pensions, with sixty-seven percent of private sector 67 union members and
seventy-eight percent of public sector 68 union members receiving
pensions through their employer. 69 Employers contribute twenty-eight
percent more towards pensions of union members than employers of nonunion members. 70 Further, union members receive twenty-six percent
more vacation time and fourteen percent more total paid leave. 71
Another major protection most unions provide their members is
"just-cause" termination.72 The default presumption in the United States

62. See Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters, How Unions Help All Workers, ECON. POL'Y
INST. 1, 2 (Aug. 26, 2003), https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapersbpl43/.
63. Robert P. Hunter, Why Beck Rights Are Important to Workers, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB.
POL'Y (May 1, 1997), https://www.mackinac.org/1021(noting that even non-union members receive

several of the benefits of union membership).
64. Benefits of Union Membership, UNIONPLUS, https://www.unionplus.org/page/benefitsunion-membership (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).
65. Id.; Mishel & Walters, supra note 62, at 2.
66.

Mishel & Walters, supra note 62, at 2.

67. "The [p]rivate [s]ector is usually comprised of organizations run by individuals and groups
who seek to generate and return a profit back to its owners. Organizations in the private section are
usually free from government control or ownership." Private Sector, PRIVACYSENSE.NET (2016),
http://www.privacysense.net/terms/private-sector/.
68. "The [p]ublic [s]ector is usually comprised of organizations that are owned and operated by
the government and exist to provide services for its citizens." Public Sector, PRIVACYSENSE.NET
(2016), http://www.privacysense.net/terms/public-sector/. Examples include education, emergency
services, healthcare, law enforcement, and public transit. Id. While public sector employees are
statutorily excluded from protection under the NLRA, they are protected through state laws in many

states-like the Taylor Law in New York, which function similarly to the NLRA. National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) ("'employer' . . . shall not include the United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision

thereof'); see generally N.Y. CIV. SERV. L.AW §§ 200-215 (1969); Collective BargainingRights for
Public Employees, UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS OF AM., https://
www.ueunion.org/ue-policy/collective-bargaining-rights-for-public-employees

(last visited Apr. 29,

2020).
69.

Benefits of Union Membership, supra note 64.

70.
71.

Mishel & Walters, supra note 62, at 2.
Id.

72.

Robert M. Schwartz, Using 'JustCause' to Defend Against Unfair Discipline,LAB. NOTES

15,
(Jan.
discipline.

2019),

https://www.labomotes.org/2019/01/using-just-cause-defend-against-unfair-
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is that all workers are "at-will" employees. 73 This means an employee
may be fired for a "'good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all."' 74 The
only reason an employer cannot fire an employee is an unlawful one, such
as because of the employee's protected characteristics, like race or
gender. 75 This presumption of at-will employment, however, can be
contracted away, and it commonly is in union contracts with employers. 76
These contracts, or collective bargaining agreements, typically contain
just-cause provisions, such as, "'[n]o employee will be disciplined or
discharged except for just cause"' or "'good cause,"' "'reasonable
cause,"' or "simply 'cause."' 77
Just cause requirements protect
employees from perceived unfair termination, such as terminating an
employee to hire a relative of a supervisor. 78
Union membership not only grants benefits listed under the NLRA,
but also makes workers more likely to exercise their rights to other
benefits and protections. 7 9 For example, union members are twenty-three
percent more likely to receive unemployment insurance, sixty percent
more likely to file a worker's compensation claim, ten percent more likely
to have understood their rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and
are forty-five percent more likely to seek an Occupational Safety and
Health Act inspection in the workspace. 80 This occurs because "unions
provide information to workers about benefit exceptions, rules, and
procedures." 81
But workers may only act on and enjoy these rights if they are
classified as employees by the relevant agencies. 82 Ancillary employee
rights and benefits outside the NLRA include, but are not limited to, the

73. At-Will Employment - Overview, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEG. (Apr. 15, 2008), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx.

74. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008) (quoting Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972)).
75. At- Will Employment - Overview, supranote 73; see e.g. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) ("It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire . . . any
individuals ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
76. At-Will Employment - Overview, supranote 73.
77. Schwartz, supra note 72.

78.

Id.

79.

Mishel & Walters, supranote 62, at 11-12.

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 12-14.
Id. at 12.
See generally Frangoise Carrd, (In)dependent ContractorMisclassification, ECON. POL'Y

INST. (June 8, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification/.
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federal minimum wage,83 state minimum wage,84 overtime pay, 85 federal
employment
state
protections, 86
discrimination
employment
87
unemployment insurance, 88 workers'
discrimination protections,
leave, 90 proof of
compensation insurance, 89 family medical
employment, 91 and a differing tax structure. 92
2.

The Gig Economy is Only Growing, Causing More
Workers to Be Classified as Independent Contractors

The gig economy is, unsurprisingly, also difficult to define. The
National Association of Counties recognizes three components that make
up gig work; (1) workers who are paid by the task or project as opposed
to hourly or on a salary; (2) consumers who require a temporary service;
and (3) companies that directly connect the workers and consumers. 93
These companies are typically app-based, such as Uber or Lyft.94

83. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2020); see also Carr6, supra note
82, at 4.
84. See generally New York State Minimum Wage Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 650-694
(McKinney 2020); see also Carr6, supra note 82, at 4.
85. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 207; see also Carr6, supra note 82, at 4.

86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2020) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2020) ("[i]t shall be unlawful for an
employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against

any individual with respect to his compensation, terns, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age"); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2020)
("[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in
regard to job application- procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment").

87. See e.g., New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney
2020).
88. See e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW 18 §§ 500-643 (McKinney 2020).
89. See Andrew G. Malik, Worker Classifcation and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS UNIV. L.
REv. 1729, 1734 (2017); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 2(4) (McKinney 2020).
90. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2020).
91. Malik, supra note 89, at 1734. Lacking proof of employment may be a draw back for
individuals attempting to rent or securing a loan. Id.

92. Id.
93. Emilia Istrate & Jonathan Harris, The Futureof Work: The Rise of the Gig Economy, NAT'L
ASS'N OF COUNTIES: COUNTIES FUTURES LAB 2, 3 (Nov. 2017), https://www.naco.org/sites/default

/files/documents/Gig-Economy.pdf.
94.

Id.
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While most gig work is now app-based, the gig 9 5 economy is not
new, nor is classifying gig workers as independent contractors. 96 This
classification of worker was first recognized in 1917 with the creation of
the 1099 tax form. 9 7 Then, in 1938, the term was listed as an exclusion to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA") protections, and again
in 1947 as an exclusion to the NLRA. 9 8
Independent contract work and the gig economy have only grown
since the early 20h century. 99 Businesses comprised primarily of
independent contractors and temporary workers have grown by 2.6
percent annually while traditional payroll businesses have grown only by
0.8 percent annually since 1997.100 In 2005, 10.7 percent of individuals
in the workforce worked in "alternative work arrangements," which
include temporary help, on-call workers, contract company workers, and
independent contractors. 10 1 This number rose to 15.8 percent in 2015.102
When looking solely at independent contractors, it is estimated that
independent contracting rose by roughly thirty percent from 2005 to
2015.103 In May 2017, the Bureau of Labor Statistics stated that 10.6
million individuals worked primarily as independent contractors,
comprising a total of 6.9 percent of the work force.1 04 And in 2018, a
Gallup Poll reported that thirty-six percent of workers are part of the gig

95.

Id. See also Brandie P., The History of the Modern Gig Economy, WRITER'S ACCESS (Oct.

(explaining
23, 2019), https://www.writeraccess.com/blog/the-history-of-the-modem-gig-economy/
that the term "gig" is over a century old, with jazz musicians in the early 1900s describing their
performances as "gigs").
96.
97.

Istrate & Harris, supra note 93, at 3.
Team Bunker, A Brief History of the Independent Contractor Classification, BUNKER,

https://vault.buildbunker.com/2019/01/11/independent-contractor-history/
2020).
98. Id.; Rivlin-Nadler, supranote 34.
99.

100.

(last visited Apr.

12,

Istrate & Harris, supranote 93, at 3.

Robert Maxim & Mark Muro, Rethinking worker benefits for an economy in flux,

BROOKINGS (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/29/rethinkingworker-benefits-for-an-economy-in-flux/.
101. Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Kruger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work
Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015, 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.

22667, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22667.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Corey Husak, How US. companies harm workers by making them independent contractors,
WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (July 31, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/how-u-scompanies-harm-workers-by-making-them-independent-contractors/.
104. Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements - May 2017, U.S. DEP'T LAB.
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf. It is

impossible to tell if these individuals are misclassified based on the numbers presented. Further, most
of these individuals self-classify, and some of them wrongfully identify. Id.
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economy in some capacity.10 5 In fact, in 2015, twenty-four percent of
people made some money through an online platform, most of them as
independent contractors. 106
For the majority of individuals, however, this money is not
supplemental income. 107 Rather, fifty-six percent of individuals say the
income they make through these platforms is "'essential' or
However, a worker's income-and several other
'important. "' 108
rights-may not be protected if the worker is an independent contractor
and not an employee. 109
Properly classifying workers as either employees or independent
contractors is essential to ensuring they are adequately protected. Despite
this, workers are frequently misclassified, both by their employer and
themselves. 11 0 According to the Economic Policy Institute, between ten
and twenty percent of employers misclassify at least one worker as an
Further, twenty-six percent of gig workers
independent contractor."
believe themselves to be employees of the company where they solicit
112
This
work, despite being classified as independent contractors.
was
who
an
individual
for
catastrophic
be
can
classification
confusion in
is
in
or
she
he
out
find
to
later
wrongfully classified as an employee, only
actuality an independent contractor, thereby losing the above listed rights
and protections.11 3

HOW THE BOARD CLASSIFIES WORKERS

II.
A.

The Board'sAuthority to Classify Workers

The NLRA was passed to protect the rights of workers to bargain
collectively and act in concert for mutual aid and protection regarding the

105. Shane Mcfeely & Ryan Pendell, What Workplace Leaders Can Learn From the Real Gig
Economy, GALLUP (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.gallup.com/workplace/240929/workplace-leaderslearn-real-gig-economy.aspx.
106. Aaron Smith, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2016/ 1/1 7/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing/.

107.
108.
109.
(May 8,

Id.
Id.
Chris Ceplenski, Why Proper Worker ClassificationIs So Important, HR DAILY ADVISOR
2014), https://hrdailyadvisor.bir.com/2014/05/08/why-proper-worker-classification-is-so-

important/.
110. Carr, supra note 82, at 1.

111. Id.
112.

Smith, supra note 106.

113.

Carr6, supra note 82, at 4-5.
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terms and conditions of their employment. 11 4 In the Act's "findings and
declaration of policy" section, Congress
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection. 115

To achieve this goal, Section 3(a) of the NLRA created the Board to
administer the Act." 6 The Board is comprised of five members, all of
whom are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate."1 7
Board members serve for a five-year term. 118 Each Board member's term
expires in different years depending on their "seat." 119 For example, the
term for the member who sits in the Madden Seat 12 0 expires in years
ending in zero and five, while the term for a Smith Seat121 expires in years
ending in one and six.1 22 While there is no explicit rule governing the
composition of the Board, it is tradition for the Board to have no more
than three members of one political party.1 23 This tradition has resulted
in, on most occasions, the Board majority reflecting the political party of
the President.1 24
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the Board's authority
to classify workers, thereby defining employee and independent
contractor for the purposes of the NLRA.1 25 This authority stems from
114. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
115. Id. § 151. One such "substantial obstructions" is "diminution of employment wages." Id.
116. Id. § 153(a).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Members ofthe NLRB since 1935, NAT'L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb
/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).

120. See id. The Madden Seat is named after J. Warren Madden, the first Chairman of the Board.
Id. All seats are named after the first individual to serve in that capacity. Id.

121. See id. The Smith Seat is named after Edwin S. Smith. Id.
122. Id.
123.

William B. Gould IV, Politics and the Effect on the National Labor Relations Board's

Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes,64 EMORY L. J. 1501, 1507-08 (2015).
124.

See Members of the NLRB since 1935, supra note 119.

125.

See generally NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968) (explaining the difference

between employees and independent contractors). Section 9(b) of the NLRA vests the Board with the

authority to decide "appropriate" bargaining units. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

§

159

(2018). As independent contractors are statutorily barred from bargaining unit membership, this
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NLRB v. United Insurance Co. and Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural
26
In United Insurance, the Supreme
Resources Defense Council, Inc.1
Court was asked whether "debit agents" were employees or independent
contractors. 127 Previously, the Board classified the agents as employees,
but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the agents to be independent
contractors. 128 In a show of deference to the Board, the Court held the
Board's decision regarding whether a worker is an employee or
independent contractor should not be overturned if it was a "choice
129
While the Court believed the
between two fairly conflicting views."
Board is in no way more suited or expert in such questions of worker
classification, merely because the Court could have reached a different
130
conclusion was not enough for reversal.
Sixteen years after UnitedInsurance, the Supreme Court articulated
a general doctrine regarding deference to federal agencies interpreting
statutes they administer. 13 1 In Chevron, the Court was asked whether the
Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the Clean Air Act
was permissible.1 32 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held that a
court will uphold an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. 133 The reviewing court does not impose its own interpretation of
the statute. 1 34 For this reason, the Court, on an appeal, upheld the Board's
interpretation of employee and independent contractor in Town & Country
13 5
Electric, citing Chevron in its reasoning.

means the Board ultimately has the authority to classify as worker as an employee or independent
contractor.

Id. § 152.

126. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984).
127. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 255. This decision was pre-Chevron. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
837 (decided in June 1984).
128. UnitedIns. Co., 390 U.S. at 255.
129. Id. at 260.
130. Id. ("It should also be pointed out that such a determination of pure agency law involved no
administrative expertise that a court does not possess.").

131. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left
a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency.").
132. Id. at 840.
133. Id. at 842 ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoke to the precise
question at issue.").
134. Id. at 843.
135. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 90,94 (1995).
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36

1. Clinton Era (1993-2000)
President Bill Clinton was sworn in to office in 1993.137 However,
due to a controversial Senate hearing, he was unable to appoint anyone to
the Board until March 1994.138 This left the Board Republican-dominated
for over one year of his Presidency. 139 Prior to the confirmation of his
first appointment, the Board issued two classifications decisions regarding
drivers: Diamond L and Yellow Cab. 140 In Diamond L, the Board stated
the test to determine whether a taxi driver is an employee or independent
contractor is the "'right of control' test." 141 This test asks "whether the
party for whom the service is performed has the right to control the
'manner and means' of performance or whether that party is concerned
only with the final result." 42 Additionally, the test looks to
"'entrepreneurialrisk' undertaken by the party performing the service." 14 3
This test differed greatly from the previously established common-law
agency test as recognized in United Insurance.144
In Yellow Cab, about seven months after Diamond L, the Board
expressed the test for taxi drivers differently.1 45 The Board stated that

136. NLRB CiteNet, NAT'L LAB. RELS. BD., https://citenet.nlrb.gov/citenet/home/ (last visited
Mar. 6, 2021). The Board decisions addressed below are accessed through CiteNet, the Board's
topical index. This index contains all Board decisions dating back to 1992. The specific decisions
were accessed through filtering using the classification number for "independent contractors" (1772484-5000-0000) under the heading "statutory exclusions of employee status," and limiting the search
to just Board decisions and cases after January 20, 1993. From the 171 results produced, the repeat
results were grouped together, and further narrowed into those about drivers and those of other
professions, analyzing the most recent Board decision for each that addressed the classification
question. Id.
137.

Thomas L. Friedman, The Inauguration; Clinton Takes Oath as 42D President, Urging

Sacrifice to 'Renew America', N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/21/us
/inauguration-clinton-takes-oath-42d-president-urging-sacrifice-renew-america.html.
138. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB-A

MEMOIR 18-24 (2000).
139. Members of the NLRB Since 1935, supra note 119.
140. See generally Yellow Cab of Quincy, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (1993) (changing the "right
of control" test for taxi drivers); see generally Diamond L Transp., Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (1993)
(explaining the "right of control" test).
141. DiamondL Transp., Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 630.
142. Id. at 630-31.
143. Id. at 631 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968)).
144. See generally United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 255. (explaining a test contrary to the commonlaw test).

145. See generally Yellow Cab of Quincy, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. at 144 (changing the test when
applied to taxi drivers).
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they still considered control of manner and means, but they will also
consider "whether there is any correlation between the employer's income
and the amount of fares collected by its drivers," adding another factor to
the analysis. 146 Any mention of entrepreneurial risk in Yellow Cab is
absent. 147 Within a year the Republican-majority Board altered its
48
approach to classifying the same type of worker.1
When the Board switched to a Democratic-majority after the
confirmation of Clinton's nominee, the test was altered again, this time,
even more drastically. 149 In Prime Time Shuttle, issued a year and a half
after Yellow Cab, the Board articulated an eight factor test-five more
factors than in the prior decision-in applying the "right to control" test:
(1) whether individuals perform functions that are an essential part of
the Company's normal operations or operate an independent business;
(2) whether they have a permanent working arrangement with the
Company which will ordinarily continue as long as performance is
satisfactory; (3) whether they do business in the Company's name with
assistance from the Company's personnel and ordinarily sell only the
Company's products; (4) whether the agreement which contains the
terms and conditions under which they operate was promulgated and
changed unilaterally by the Company; (5) whether they account to the
Company for the funds they collect under a regular reporting system
prescribed by the Company; (6) whether particular skills are required for
the operations subject to the contract; (7) whether they have a
proprietary interest in the work in which they are engaged; and (8)
whether they have the opportunity to make decisions which involve risks
taken by the independent businessman which may result in profit or
loss.1

50

All of these factors were used to determine whether the alleged
employer controlled the manner and means by which the alleged
employees worked.1 5 1
Then, only four months later, in Schoolman, the Board again
expressed the test differently by adopting the decision of an

146. Id.
147. See generally id. (focusing on "entrepreneurial opportunity" in the analysis); Cf Diamond
L Transp., Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 630 ("the analysis also includes examination of the 'entrepreneurial

risk' undertaken by the party performing the service.").
148.

Members of the NLRB since 1935, supra note 119.

149.

See generally Prime Time Shuttle Int'l, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 840 (1994) (expanding

the "right to control" test in its analysis).

150. Id.
151. Id.
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Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "AL").15 2 While the eight factors
found in Prime Time Shuttle were echoed verbatim, "'entrepreneurial
53
risk"' reappeared, though it was listed separate from the eight factors.1
While it can be argued that the eighth factor from Prime Time Shuttle,
"whether they have the opportunity to make decisions which involve risks
taken by the independent businessman which may result in profit or loss,"
is the same as entrepreneurial risk, the ALJ specifically severed it from
the Prime Time Shuttle factors, analyzing it separately. 154 Additionally,
the Board stated the "method of compensation and tax withholding"
should also be considered, though did not enumerate it like the factors in
prior decisions.15 5 It is also important to note the ALJ referred to the test
featured as the common-law agency test and the right-of-control test
interchangeably. 156 At no point does the Board attempt to correct the
ALJ, distinguishing the tests and explaining their proper applications. 157
Roadway and Dial-A-Mattress, both issued on the same day, almost
three years after Schoolman, again fundamentally changed the way the
Board classified workers. These decisions were so monumental, they
were featured under the "Big Decisions, Big Controversy" section of the
Board's eightieth anniversary publication. 158 The changes presented in
Roadway and Dial-A-Mattress were arguably the most drastic change in
the Board's approach to classification. The approach in both of these
cases was the same, though in Roadway, the Board found the drivers to be
employees, while in Dial-A-Mattress,they were found to be independent
contractors.159
In Roadway, the Board abandoned the right-of-control test-the test
previously revered as the proper approach in all Clinton-era decisions,
regardless of the actual contents of the test. 160 Instead, the Board relied on
the common-law agency test, as expressed by in United Insurance, as the
proper approach. 16 1 In United Insurance, Justice Black, writing for the
152.

See generally Schoolman Transportation System, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 716 (1995)

(the Board rephrased the "right-of-control" test, applying the common law of agency, but arranging
the test into a list of non-determinative factors).

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See NAT'L LAB. RELS. BD., EIGHTY YEARS OF WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 66 (2015),
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1536

/NLRB%2080th%20Anniversary.pdf.
159. Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 891 (1998).
160. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 850 (1998).
161. See id. at 849 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968)).
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Court, declared that Congress' intention in passing the Taft-Hartley
Amendment to the NLRA was for "the Board and the courts [to] apply
general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and
Despite the factors listed in United
independent contractors." 162
Insurance,163 both parties in Roadway pointed towards a modified version
of these factors found in the Restatement of Agency. 164 These factors are:
[1] the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
[2] whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation
or business;
[3] the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
[4] the skill required in the particular occupation;
[5] whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
[6] the length of time for which the person is employed;
[7] the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
[8] whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;

162. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256.
163. Id. at 259 ("These factors are the agents do not operate their own independent businesses,
but perform functions that are an essential part of the company's normal operations; they need not
have any prior training or experience, but are trained by company supervisory personnel; they do
business in the company's name with considerable assistance and guidance from the company and its

managerial personnel and ordinarily sell only the company's policies; the "Agent's Commission
Plan" that contains the terms and conditions under which they operate is promulgated and changed
unilaterally by the company; the agents account to the company for the funds they collect under an
elaborate and regular reporting procedure; the agents receive the benefits of the company's vacation

plan and group insurance and pension fund; and the agents have a permanent working arrangement
with the company under which they may continue as long as their performance is satisfactory.").
164. Roadway PackageSys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. at 850.
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[9] whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
[10] whether the principal is or is not in business. 165

The Board accepted the Restatement factors as the proper factors to
rely on, never again mentioning the factors listed in United Insurance.1 66
Although the Restatement "ultimately assesses the amount or degree of
control exercised by an employing entity over an individual," the Board
rejected the notion that factors not including control were "insignificant
when compared to those that do."1 67 In reaching this decision, the Board
relied on language from the Supreme Court- "'all of the incidents of the
relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being
decisive"'-and the Comments of the Restatement- "'[t]he factors ...
68
are all considered in determining the question [of employee status].'"
This means when classifying workers, the Board should look to the factors
listed in the Restatements, but use a totality of the circumstances approach
when reaching its determination.
The Board continued applying the common-law agency test from
Roadway and Dial-A-Mattress in their next two decisions, issued two
years later.1 69 In fact, in one of these subsequent decisions, even though
the ALJ below applied the common-law agency factors, the Board made
note that the ALJ improperly referred to the test as the right-of-control
test, making it clear the old control-centric test was scrapped.1 70

2.

Bush Era (2001-2008)

When President George W. Bush came to office in 2001, he
appointed three Republicans to the Board, creating a Republican-majority
on the Board for the first time since 1993.171 Despite this, the Board did
not depart drastically from the framework established by the Clinton
Board. Nearly two years after the last classification decision in the
Clinton era, the Bush Board heard its first driver classification case, and

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
166. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. at 849-50.
167. Id. at 850.
168. Id.
169. Slay Transp. Co., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 170, 1293 (2000); Stamford Taxi, Inc., 332
N.L.R.B. No. 149, 1373 (2000).
170. Stamford Taxi, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1373.
171. Board Members Since 1935, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nirb.gov/about-nlrb
/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
165.
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again pointed to the common-law agency test as the proper analysis. 172
Again, two years after that, the Board continued this trend in their decision
Community Bus Lines.1 73 However, the analysis there was not parallel to
the analysis found in previous cases. 174 Instead, the Board classified
workers based on whether the facts aligned more with those in Roadway,
where workers were found to be employees, or Dial-A-Mattress, where
workers were classified as independent contractors. 175
In Friendly Cab, decided merely one month after Community Line,
the Board again asserted the common-law agency test as the proper test
when classifying workers. 176 There, the Board affirmed the decision of
the Regional Director, which found drivers to be employees. 177 However,
when analyzing the relevant facts, the Regional Director did not apply to
the distinctive facts to each of the ten Restatement factors. 17 8 Instead, the
Regional Director spoke broadly about facts weighing in favor of
employee status and those in favor of independent contractor status. 179
This makes it difficult to distinguish which facts the Regional Director,
and subsequently the Board, determined held weight regarding each
common-law agency factor.1 80
Less than half a year after Friendly Cab, the Bush Board issued its
last driver classification decision.181 The ALJ, in his decision below,
seemingly reverted back to their comparator style approach used in
Community Bus Line, at no point applying the common-law agency
test.1 82 The Board adopts the ALJ's decision, again, without applying the
common-law agency test. 183 What is most troublesome is the Board's
disregard toward changing facts between the ALJ's decision and their
own. Between the two decisions, the parties stipulated some drivers were

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Time Auto Transp., 338 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 626 (2002).
Cmty. Bus Lines/Hudson County Exec. Express, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 480 (2004).
See generally id. (reaching the same conclusion with a different analysis).
Id. at 480.
See Friendly Cab Co. Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 722, 724 (2004).
See id. at 722.
See id at 724.
See id.
See generally id. (the Board looked at the overall evidence presented by the taxicab drivers

as a whole when determining whether they are independent contractors or not, rather than applying
the restatement factors).

181.

See generally Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (2004).

182.

See id at 1309; see generally Cmty. Bus Lines/Hudson Cnty. Exec. Express, 341 N.L.R.B.

No. 61, 480 (2004) (comparing the Respondent's owner-operated bus drivers to the Respondent's
other drivers when determining employee status).

183.

See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, Inc, 342 N.L.R.B. at 1301.
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employees. 184 Nevertheless, the Board claims the union was unable to
show the drivers were employees on procedural grounds. 185

3. Obama Era (2009-2016)
When President Barack Obama assumed office in 2009, at first, his
Democratic appointees to the Board continued the precedent set by
previous Boards. 186 Such can be seen in N. Y. Party Shuttle, decided nine
years after the Bush Board's last driver classification case.1 87 There, the
Board affirmed an ALJ's ruling that a driver was an employee.188 While
the ALJ mischaracterized the common-law agency test, at times referring
to it as the right-to-control test, and placing considerable weight on
control, the Board took note of this error in a footnote.1 89
0
Then, just over one year later, the Obama Board decided FedEx.19
Despite the predominantly consistent application of the common-law
agency test from the end of the Clinton era through the Bush era, FedEx
"restate[d] and refme[d]" the test. 19 1 Like past boards, the Obama Board
reaffirmed the importance of the Supreme Court's United Insurance
decision, again stressing all common-law agency factors must be
considered without one factor being decisive. 192
When FedEx was initially decided by the Board, FedEx delivery
drivers were held to be employees.1 93 However, this decision was
appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 194 Judge Brown, writing for the court,
restated that the Board and courts apply the common-law agency test
when determining whether a worker is an employee or independent

184. Id.
185. See id.at 1300-01.
186. See N.Y. Party Shuttle, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 1048 (2013) (affirming the AL's
ruling that a driver is an employee).
187.

See generally id. (continuing to apply the common-law agency test as the proper test for

employee classification).
188. Id. at 1048.
189. Id.at 1046 n.2 ("We note that the judge characterized the longstanding common law agency
test of independent contractor status as a 'right-to-control' test. However, the Board has repeatedly
stated that an employer's right to control the manner and means of performing a job is but one of a
number of factors to be considered under the common law test, 'with no one factor being decisive."').

190. FedEx Home Delivery, an Operating Div. of FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 361
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 610 (2014).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Fedex Home Delivery, an Operating Div. of FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 356
N.L.R.B. No. 10, 39 (2010).
194. FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492,495 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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contractor. 19 5 The majority recognized this test previously used the ten
Restatement factors, but considered it a "non-exhaustive" list. 196 The
majority asserted the test formerly focused on control, but shifted to
"entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss," declaring it the "animating
principle" of the test. 197 This means that all common-law agency factors
were considered in relation to the amount of entrepreneurial opportunity
they presented.1 98 However, if the opportunity could not realistically be
taken by the worker, then such opportunity would not weigh in favor of
independent contractor status. 199 Using the newly developed animating
principle approach, Judge Brown reversed the Board, finding the drivers
were not employees, rather independent contractors. 200
The Board, after re-hearing the case that was initially vacated by the
court, rejected the D.C. Circuit's notion that entrepreneurial opportunity
is the "animating principle" of the analysis. 20 1 Instead, the Board doubled
down on the traditional common-law agency test first found in Roadway
and Dial-A-Mattress.202 It explicitly laid out how all factors should be
considered: "(1) all factors must be assessed and weighed; (2) no one
factor is decisive; (3) other relevant factors may be considered, depending
on the circumstances; and (4) the weight to be given a particular factor or
group of factors depend on the factual circumstances of each case." 203
While the Board asserted the four considerations have been present
since Roadway and Dial-A-Mattress, other relevant factors have
predominantly been absent from the Board's analysis until FedEx.2 04
Instead, the Board traditionally focused exclusively on the enumerated ten
common-law agency factors. 2 05 Therefore, despite the Board trying to
walk away from the D.C. Circuit's inflation of entrepreneurial
opportunity, the Obama Board entertained entrepreneurial opportunity

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
Board's

Id. at 495-96.
Id at 496.
Id at 497.
See id. at 504.
See id at 502.
Id. at 504. The majority did not acknowledge the required deference the court owes to the
interpretation, though Judge Garland, dissenting, did reference Chevron and this required

deference: "although the NLRB may have authority to alter the test, or at least to alter its focus, see
Chevron . . , this court does not." Id at 510.

201. FedEx Home Delivery, an Operating Division of FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 361
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 610 (2014).
202. See id. at 621.
203. Id at 611.
204. See id. at 612.
205. See id. at 610.
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unlike other previous Boards. 206 The Board went so far as to lay out
subfactors to consider when looking at entrepreneurial opportunity, such
as whether workers "have the ability to work for other companies, can hire
their own employees, and have a proprietary interest in their work." 20 7
Additionally, the Board supported the D.C. Circuit's proposition that
weight should be given to "actual, but not merely theoretical,
entrepreneurial opportunity." 208 Ultimately, the Board tiptoes around
rolling entrepreneurial opportunity into the fold while still respecting the
common-law agency factors. 209
Also of note is the Board's peculiar application of facts to the test
here. The Board held the factor concerning what relationship the parties
believed they were creating to weigh evenly for both sides. 2 10 They
reasoned this way because drivers signed agreements stating they were
independent contractors, but a majority of drivers, by vote, wished to be
employees-hence the litigation. 21 1 However, the Board's reasoning is
flawed. In a classification decision, there is always going to be a
disagreement between the parties as to what relationship they were
creating. 2 12 This disagreement is at the heart of classification litigation. 213
If the Board considers the litigation as a fact weighing in favor employee
status, this factor could never weigh in favor of independent contractor
status. 2 14 At best, it is always going to be weighed evenly for both
sides. 2 15 Therefore, the parties' litigation cannot be probative in the
analysis. 2 16

4. Trump Era (2017-2020)
Over four years after FedEx, the Trump Board-at that point a
Republican-majority of all Trump appointees-decided SuperShuttle
which dismantled past classification framework and dissected FedEx,
206. Id at 610.
207. Id. at 612.
208. Id. at 610.
209. See id. at 611-12.
210. Id. at 623, 627.
211. Id. at 623.
212. See generally id. at 610-11 (explaining how the law works in employee verses independent
contractor status cases).

213. See generally id. at 611 (expressing the difficulty of determining if an individual should be
classified as an employee or independent contractor).
214. See generally id at 622-25 (demonstrating how the Board weighs each factor in favor of
one side or the other).
215. See generally id. at 623 (showing two factors being weighed as neutral).
216. FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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using it as a basis to attack prior precedent. 2 17 The Board wrote, "the
Board ... ha[s] shifted the emphasis from control to whether putative
independent contractors have significant entrepreneurial opportunity for
gain or loss." 2 18 The Board further emphasized how entrepreneurial
opportunity is not treated merely as a factor, but instead is incorrectly used
as the animating "principle to help evaluate the overall significance of the
agency factors." 2 19
What the Trump Board points to in SuperShuttle, however, was cast
off in the Board's decision in FedEx-be it just in words or in practice. 220
Member McFerran, the lone dissenter in SuperShuttle, points this out to
the Board, yet the Board merely writes, in a footnote, "our review of the
Board's case law shows, entrepreneurial opportunity, however it is
221
characterized, has always been at the core of the common-law test."
While the Trump Board attacks the Obama Board for altering the
test, the Trump Board, too, alters the test. 222 Both Boards agree the
common-law agency test requires the Board to look to the Restatement
factors as "'all the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and
weighed with no one factor being decisive."' 223 But on the same page the
Trump Board stresses the importance of all factors being equal and that
no factors be weighed more heavily, it claims the Board has historically
given more weight to two factors in the driver context. 22 4 These factors
are "'the lack of any relationship between the company's compensation
and the amount of fares collected,' and 'the company's lack of control
the drivers conduct business after
over the manner and means by which
225
garage."'
[company's]
leaving the
The improper weight given to these factors, namely the one
focused on control, is even more problematic when looking at other
portions of the Board's decision. 226 The Board explicitly rejected
Member McFerran's proposition that the common-law agency test centers
217. SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 1 (2019).
218. Id. at 2.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2 n.4 (McFerran, L., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2-3.
223. Id. at 1-2; FedEx Home Delivery, an Operating Division of FedEx Ground Package Sys.,
Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 623 (Sept. 30, 2014) ("[A]ll of the incidents of the relationship must be
assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive."').
224. See SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. at 2-3. This idea of significant weight being
given to these two factors stems from two cases predating the refining of the common-law agency
test in Roadway, and therefore incorrectly draws on outdated precedent. Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.
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around control. 227 Moreover, the Board reiterated that factors that do not
center around control are still significant in an analysis. 2 28 Further, the
Board conceded the Restatement "expressly recognizes that a masterservant relationship can exist in the absence of the master's control over
the servant's performance of work." 229 Thus, the Board is simultaneously
embracing control and inflating its weight in the analysis, while at the
same time stating control should not be the "'core concept"' of the
230
analysis and that all factors much be considered.
Ultimately, SuperShuttle rejected FedEx, claiming it was
unnecessary and refusing to even characterize it as a "'refinement"' of the
common-law agency test.23 1 The Trump Board refused to even consider
entrepreneurial opportunity as a factor, despite the original common-law
agency test allowing for factors other than those listed to be considered. 232
For future cases, the Board limited the use of entrepreneurial opportunity
to instances "when the specific factual circumstances of the case make
such an evaluation appropriate." 233
But this, like Board's statements about control, are inconsistent with
the rest of the Board's decision. 234 The Board wrote, "control and
entrepreneurial opportunity are two sides of the same coin: the more of
one, the less of the other." 235 Further, the Board stated, "[g]enerally,
common-law factors that support a worker's entrepreneurial opportunity
indicate independent-contractor status; factors that support employer
control indicate employee status." 236 Therefore, this apprehension to
entrepreneurial opportunity is needless. If the Board's assertion that the
two are equal counterbalances, from what side the Board measures from
is meaningless. 237 Whether the Board states they are considering control,
entrepreneurial opportunity, or both, it does not matter. Regardless of the
measure, the Board should reach the same conclusion. 238 Additionally,
as the factual circumstances of any case would make considering control

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.

233. Id. The Board offers no guidance as to when factual circumstances would make such an
evaluation appropriate. Id.

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See infra notes 235-36.
SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. at 11.
Id. at 2.
See id. at 9.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

25

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4
310

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 38:2

appropriate, it would be just as appropriate to consider entrepreneurial
opportunity. 239
Seven months after SuperShuttle, the same Board issued a new
decision that again dealt with classifying drivers. 24 0 Despite the Board
railing against entrepreneurial opportunity in SuperShuttle, they
resurrected entrepreneurial opportunity in Velox Express.24 1 In fact, the
Board did not merely apply entrepreneurial opportunity as a factor, but
instead used it as a "prism" to view all the other factors through.2 42 Using
entrepreneurial opportunity in this way has no practical difference than
using it as an "animating" principle, of which the Board took grave insult
to in its decision seven months prior. 243

CONCLUSION
Nearly every time the Board is asked to classify drivers, the Board
articulates a test that is inconsistent with its previous one.244 While the
Board has consistently used the common-law agency test since Roadway
and Dial-A-Mattress, its application varies from case to case, with the
most recent cases differing most dramatically. 24 5 Disputes have arisen
regarding how the test is applied, what it really measures, and the weight
each factor holds.24 6 With each Board answering these questions
differently, each Board alters the test to suit its preference of the day. 247
This inconsistency goes beyond mere different political agendas of
Presidents and their respective political parties. Boards with the same
political majority, and even Boards comprised of the exact same members,
have been inconsistent in their approach. 248
239. Id.
240. See generally Velox Express, Inc. 368 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (2019).
241. Id. at 3.
242. Id.
243. SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. at 2.
244. Compare NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 254 (1968) (applying the law of agency
with an emphasis on factors of control), with Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 851
(1998) (applying common law agency test with several equal factors), with FedEx Home Delivery,
Operating Division of FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 610 (defining and
analyzing actual entrepreneurial opportunity as an "animating principle"), with SuperShuttle DFW,
Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. at 1 (overruling FedEx and returning to the traditional common law test).
245. Compare SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. at 1 (finding independent contractor status

based on entrepreneurial opportunity and other factors), with Friendly Cab Co., 341 N.L.R.B. No.
103, 722 (2004) (finding employee status based on control and support of employer including a
voucher-based compensation system).
246. See supra Part I.
247. See supra Part II.
248. See supra Part II.
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Ultimately, the common-law agency test gives the Board too much
leeway when classifying workers, letting the Board make decisions that
are nothing more than "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" gut feelings guised with
the illusion of law.24 9 First, the current test allows the Board to weigh the
facts and common-law agency factors as they please. 250 The commonlaw agency test is not a checklist where if a majority of the ten factors
weigh in favor of employee status, the worker is classified as an
employee. 25 1 Instead, it is up to the Board to assess and give weight to
the factors when making a determination. 2 52 This means even where only
one factor may weigh in favor of employee status, the worker can still be
classified as an employee. 253
Second, even when cases share the same facts, Boards will treat them
differently due to the lack of guidance on how facts should be analyzed. 254
For example, one Board may find a fact weighs in favor of employee
status when looking at a particular factor, while another may find it is
neutral, and yet another may find it weighs in favor of independent
contractor status. Additionally, this lack of guidance can cause a Board
to inconsistently apply similar facts to different factors in the test. 255
Third, it allows the Board to consider factors outside of those listed in the
Restatement. 256 This allows one Board to give significant weight to an
outside factor when making a decision and another Board to ignore it
outright. 257 Also, it means workers and advocates alike cannot predict
whether facts that fall outside the ten common-law agency factors will
carry weight with the Board.25 8
These problems are compounded by the near lack of judicial review
of these decisions. 259 United Insurance and Chevron grant the Board the
authority to define employee and independent contractor-and thereby
alter the test to reach these definitions. 260 So long as the Board's
classification is reasonable, such a classification will be upheld.2 61 This
means a grievant appealing a classification decision based solely on prior
249.

See supraPart II.

250.
251.
252.
253.

See supraPart II.B.4.
See supranotes 165-68, 192, 223-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165-68, 192, 223-24 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 165-68, 192, 223-24 and accompanying text.

254.
255.

See supranotes 10-12 and accompanying text.
See supraPart II.

256.
257.
258.
259.

See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section

260.
261.

See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.

II.B.1.
II.B.1.
II.B.1.

H.A.
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Board precedent would be futile. 262 Such is true even if the facts of the
grievant's case and the prior decision are near identical. 263
The Board's approach to classification leaves both the legal
community and workers in the dark as to a worker's status prior to a
decision. 2 64 Now more than ever, with the growth of the gig economy, it
is vital for workers to know whether they are employees or independent
contractors as the distinction carries with it various benefits and rights. 2 65
While defining employee and independent contractor in a way that fairly
categorizes workers into one column or the other is near impossible, and
any test is bound to have problems, the Board's current approach is too
flawed, too inconsistent, and therefore must be revisited.26 6

262. See supra Sections II.B.3., II.B.4.
263. See supra Sections I.B.3., II.B.4.
264. See supra Sections IL.B.2., II.B.3.
265.

See supra Section I.B.1.

266. See supra pp. 285-87.
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